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Abstract
This paper will explore risk-spreading practices in the so-called popular
economy in South Africa. Concepts like ‘insurance’, ‘insurance law’ and
‘customary law’ will be interrogated, with the analysis falling on
traditional and more modern informal responses to risk, as well as more
formal responses resulting from the increased penetration of private
insurance in the democratic era. This contribution aims to address
concerns expressed about both informal and formal risk-spreading
practices, to argue towards a conclusion that a pluralistic notion of
‘insurance’ should not necessarily be sacrificed in service of corporate
profit aims. Value remains in customary insurance law, and these
cultural responses may provide evidence of a broader contract value
system to be used in the service of developing the South African laws of
contract and insurance. At the very least, this value system should
inform concepts like ‘consumer insurance law’ and should be fore-
grounded in developing a notion of micro-insurance. South Africa has
the potential to be a world leader in the field of customary insurance law,
as the failings of a comparable system — funeral insurance in Australia
— demonstrate.
Keywords: insurance; legal pluralism; popular economy; micro-insurance;
indigenous persons; South Africa; Australia.
I INTRODUCTION
This article forms part of a broader inquiry into what is African about
contracting in South Africa.1 The South African Constitution recognises
two equal, but distinct, sources of law: one, the common law, which
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1 See, further, Hutchison, ‘Decolonising South African contract law: an argument for
synthesis’ in Siliquini-Cinelli & Hutchison (eds), The Constitutional Dimension of Contract
Law: A Comparative Analysis (Springer 2017) 151.
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governs formal sector contracts in South Africa; the other, customary
law, which is a separate, constitutionally recognised, source of law and
applies ‘when ... applicable’.2 Chanock has described these (from a
historical perspective) as comprising the ‘common law A’ and ‘common
law B’ of South African law respectively.3 He notes that during the
formative period of South African law in the first part of the twentieth
century, each had its own set of legislation and courts, which built up
two parallel branches of the law, namely one for the ruling white
population and the other for the (disenfranchised) indigenous African
population.4 Today, in the democratic era, all law is subject to a supreme
Constitution and, as a result, there is only one system of law in South
Africa.5 Due to s 211(3) of the Constitution, however, the common law
and customary law remain (to a certain extent) parallel — although now
equal — partners in a legally plural framework of law.6
Insurance, as provided by private insurance companies in South
Africa, has usually been thought of as an example of a so-called specific
contract in this country, governed by the common law of contract
(including some insurance contract-specific terms implied by law),7
and a few sector-specific pieces of legislation.8 There are, of course,
other recognised forms of insurance outside the domain of private insur-
ance companies, particularly certain compulsory forms of social insurance,
such as those funded by workers in formal employment for the contingency
2 See ss 8, 39(2), 173 and 211(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
On the division of spheres of application between common and customary law, see Du Bois
(ed), Wille’s Principles of South African Law 9 ed (Juta 2007) chaps 2, 4 and 5; Himonga &
Nhlapo (eds), African Customary Law in South Africa: Post-Apartheid and Living Law
Perspectives (OUP 2014) part 1, especially chap 5.
3 Chanock, The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902–1936 (CUP 2001) parts III & IV.
4 Idem 243–244.
5 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA & another: in re ex parte President of the
Republic of South Africa & others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) para 44; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism & others 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) para 22.
6 On the respective roles of the common and customary law as sources of law, see, for
example, Alexkor Ltd & another v The Richtersveld Community & others 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC)
para 51; Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 (1) SA 256
(CC) para 23.
7 An authoritative common-law definition by Lee & Honore 2ed (Butterworths 1978) (SA
Law of Obligations, 149 para 586) of the contract of insurance was confirmed in Lake & others v
Reinsurance Corporation Ltd & others 1967 (3) 124 (W) at 127A: ‘[Insurance is a] contract
between an insurer ... and an insured ... whereby the insurer undertakes in return for the
payment of a price or premium to render to the insured a sum of money, or its equivalent, on
the happening of a specified uncertain event in which the insured has some interest.’
Compare, generally, Reinecke et al, South African Insurance Law (LexisNexis 2013); Davis,
Gordon & Getz: The South African Law of Insurance 4 ed (Juta 1993).
8 See, especially, Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998; Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998;
and Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002.
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of losing their employment or being otherwise unable to work.9 There is
even a link to the concept of social assistance here, whereby the government
provides a variety of grants to certain classes of the population who meet a
means test.10 (Although social assistance is not strictly speaking insurance, it
provides a safety mechanism for vulnerable members of society.)11 This
study would like to cast the net a little wider, however, to study not only
formal-sector insurance, but also informal forms of insurance. This article
therefore combines elements of both aspects of risk management to explore
the concept of ‘insurance’ in a broad sense within a sector that economic
anthropologists have labelled the ‘popular economy’.12 The intention is to
uncover insurance behaviour and ‘law’, as practised by communities at
roots level in South Africa.
The title of this article should not be read as suggesting an inquiry
strictly into ‘common law B’ as Chanock would put it (that is, customary
law). Rather, the article aims to explore risk-spreading mechanisms in
the popular economy as a whole, encompassing both formal and
informal means of insurance. The Constitutional Court has told us that
the recognised version of customary law is the ‘living’ customary law.13
This article takes the view that this living law today is not merely the
traditions of a pre-commercial society as reflected in the leading works
on customary contract law,14 but rather a vibrant tradition of modern
life and custom, which, for the commercial sector, is best explored by
empirical study. This article will henceforth draw on the empirical work
of others, particularly those working in economic anthropology and
9 For an explanation of the ‘social insurance’ concept and how this relates to social
assistance and social security, see Olivier, ‘Social security: framework’ in Joubert (ed), LAWSA
vol 13(2) 2 ed (LexisNexis 2012) paras 15–19. See, also, the discussion in Mpedi & Millard,
‘Bridging the gap: the role of micro-insurance in a comprehensive social-protection system in
South Africa’ (2010) 31 Obiter 497 at 499.
10 Olivier, (LexisNexis 2012) paras 10–14; Mpedi & Millard, (2010) 31 Obiter 497 at
498–499.
11 Olivier, (LexisNexis 2012) paras 10–14.
12 For an introduction to the concept of the ‘popular economy’, see the various essays
collected in the 2012 special issue of the journal Africa: The Journal of the International African
Institute (hereafter Africa) (vol 82(1)), particularly Hull & James, ‘Introduction: popular
economies in South Africa’ (2012) 82 Africa 1.
13 Alexkor paras 51–57; Bhe & others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha, & others (Commission for
Gender Equality as amicus curiae); Shibi v Sithole & others; South African Human Rights
Commission & another v President of the Republic of South Africa & another 2005 (1) SA 580
(CC) paras 40–46, 156–157; Shilubana & others v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) paras 42–49;
MM v MN & another 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC) paras 23–25; Himonga & Nhlapo (OUP 2014) 31.
14 Himonga & Nhlapo, (OUP 2014) chap 10; Bekker, ‘Law of contract’ in Joubert (ed),
LAWSA vol 32 ‘Indigenous Law’ 2 ed (LexisNexis 2009) paras 230–243. For a world
perspective, see Gordley, ‘Contracts in pre-commercial societies and in Western history’ in
Von Mehren (ed), International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Mohr Siebeck 1997) VII(1)
2-2–2-19.
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economic sociology, to present a broader view of what a new customary
law of insurance may entail. Having established this extended concept of
‘insurance’, the article will then argue for the continued relevance of a
pluralistic view of insurance law, which takes into account insurance
behaviour,15 and which acknowledges the continuing relevance of
indigenous norms.
Part two of this article explains the use of terminology for the
purposes of this contribution and thereby lays the foundation for what is
to follow. Part three examines insurance practices outside of the
mainstream economy and evaluates the utility of these in the popular
economy. Part four describes and evaluates insurance provided by the
formal economy to the popular market, with particular emphasis on
the types of products commonly purchased and typical problems
experienced in this interface. Part five presents a comparative account of
the Australian experience of the marketing of funeral insurance to
indigenous peoples, thereby presenting an alternative perspective to the
narrative set up in parts three and four, and illustrating how South
African culture and context give it the potential to be a world leader in
the so-called micro-insurance market. Part six concludes with a defence
of a pluralistic notion of insurance and insurance law, setting out the
case for a living customary law of insurance.
II CONCEPTS
In the interests of clarity this article will define certain concepts at the
outset. These definitions are not necessarily intended in any technical
sense, but merely to aid the exposition of the arguments contained
herein. The most important of these are described below.
(a) ‘African’
This is more of a caveat than a definition. Africa is a broad and diverse
continent, with many different peoples who have vastly differing world
views. The author does not intend to generalise here, or to defend a
stereotype. There are debates in the legal literature that defend a so-called
African worldview, and that could be read as presenting a certain measure
of cultural relativism.16 Ideas such as ubuntu, communitarianism and
15 The distinction between contract law and contract behaviour is respectively one between
the fields of study of lawyers and socio-legal scholars. In the view of the present author, both
hold merit in uncovering the best approach to insurance regulation.
16 Compare (in the context of human rights) the discussion in Wa Mutua, ‘The Banjul
Charter and the African cultural fingerprint: an evaluation of the language of duties’ (1995) 35
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humanism are often included in such discussions.17 This article, written
by an outsider to the South African indigenous community, does not
intend to voice any opinion on these issues. What this paper will do, is
draw on the work of others, particularly social scientists, who have studied
the popular economy, both empirically and through the growing second-
ary literature, to attempt to present a broader aspect of insurance practices
in South Africa. This will reveal a construct which speaks to our South
African society and economy in a way which is possibly distinct from that
found in the home countries of the so-called parent legal systems in
Europe, which provided the origins of formal South African insurance
law. In such a way, this more inclusive view of insurance ‘law in society’
could be said to be more African, or more accurately, more South African.
(b) Legal pluralism and customary law
Himonga and Nhlapo give the following description of legal pluralism:
‘[L]egal pluralism seeks to decentralise state law and draw attention to and
understand the multiple legal systems that exist officially and unofficially
within a single legal order. ...[L]egal pluralism refers to two or more legal
systems or normative orders that may or may not be recognised as strictly
legal systems but that nevertheless co-exist. The key is that they should
have sufficient authority to direct people’s behaviour and make them feel
that they ‘‘ought to do something’’ in accordance with established norms
whether explicit or not.’18
Virginia J of International Law 339; Ibhawoh, ‘Between culture and constitution: evaluating
the cultural legitimacy of human rights in the African state’ (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly
838. See, also, Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African
Experience (OUP 1997).The literature on ubuntu in South Africa also refers. See, especially,
Mokgoro, ‘Ubuntu and the law in South Africa’ (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review
15; Cornell & Muvangua (eds), Ubuntu and the Law: African Ideals and Postapartheid
Jurisprudence (Fordham University Press 2012); Diedrich (ed), Ubuntu, Good Faith and
Equity: Flexible Legal Principles in Developing a Contemporary Jurisprudence (Juta 2011); Keep
& Midgley, ‘The emerging role of ubuntu-botho in developing a consensual South African
legal culture’ in Bruinsma & Nelken (eds), Explorations in Legal Cultures (Elsevier’s-
Gravenhage 2007) 29; Himonga, ‘The right to health in an African cultural context: the role of
ubuntu in the realization of the right to health with special reference to South Africa’ (2013) 57
Journal of African Law 165; Praeg, A Report on Ubuntu (University of KwaZulu-Natal Press
2014).
17 See the sources on ubuntu in the preceding footnote.
18 Himonga & Nhlapo, (OUP 2014) 45. See, further, Bennett, ‘Comparative law and
African customary law’ in Reimann & Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of
Comparative Law (OUP 2006) 641 at 666–671; Moore, ‘Law and social change: the
semi-autonomous social field as an appropriate subject of study’ (1973) 7 Law and Society
Review 719; Griffiths, ‘What is legal pluralism?’ (1986) 18 Journal of Legal Pluralism and
Unofficial Law 1; Merry, ‘Legal pluralism’ (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869.
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For present purposes, African customary law, operating as a parallel
system of law in South Africa (as set out above), renders the South
African legal system a pluralistic one. The Constitutional Court’s
interpretation that the living customary law is the true version, means
that rather than looking for the rules and principles of this source of law
in the records of the pre-democratic courts, or in legislation, it must be
sought among the living practices of a given community.19 As such, this
presents an alternative concept of ‘law’ to what is formally recognised as
law in the more positivist (or centralist) sources of the common law.20
This means that an investigation into a customary law of insurance must
inquire into the lived practices of the South African indigenous commu-
nities. This is the realm of socio-legal studies and some solid work has
been done in this field by social scientists. This will be set out in part
three below. The net result is that what is described as ‘customary
insurance law’ in this article may not meet a positivist/centralist
definition as to what would conventionally constitute law to a lawyer.
The nature of this study means that the net has deliberately been cast
wider to encompass both insurance practices and behaviour, as well as
norms viewed as having the force of law in a given community, if not
directly by official state-sanctioned law.
(c) ‘Popular economy’
In the literature produced on South Africa’s economy, a distinction has
sometimes been drawn between the formal and informal sectors.21 The
theory behind this is that the formal sector encompasses those who are
employed in conventional employment and thus earn a salaried liveli-
hood; while the informal sector includes those outside of this realm, who
earn a living on their own entrepreneurial wits, typically within South
Africa’s townships.22 However, economic anthropologists working on
the South African economy have problematised this duality, since wages
19 See footnote 13 above. Bennett, Customary Law in South Africa (Juta 2004) 7 describes
the ‘official’ version of African customary law as existing in the forms of legislation or judicial
precedent, typically from the pre-democratic era. Bennett notes the risk of distortion in these
sources to serve ulterior social aims. Even academic versions of customary law, often based on
the official sources, may be viewed as suspect. This explains the emphasis on the living law in
the academic works on customary law of the constitutional era.
20 Compare the discussion in Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and a
Social Theory of Law (OUP 1997) chap 4.
21 For a more detailed analysis of this duality, see the debate between Callebert and Seekings
in the 2014 edition of Africa: Callebert, ‘Transcending dual economies: reflections on
‘‘popular economies in South Africa’’’ (2014) 84 Africa 119; Seekings, ‘Taking disadvantage
seriously: the ‘‘underclass’’ in post-apartheid South Africa’ (2014) 84 Africa 135.
22 See the papers cited in the preceding footnote.
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earned in the formal economy often circulate in the informal economy,
both through remittances and through the employment of this capital in
informal businesses.23 Instead, these scholars propose the term ‘popular
economy’ is used to describe the commercial sector, particularly among
those living an urban lifestyle in South Africa’s townships in which a
large portion of the indigenous population operates.24 This is the sector
which this article draws on in describing a broader view of insurance
practices. The terms ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ are retained, however, to
distinguish between traditional modes of insurance which meet the
conventional definition of that term (‘formal’) and those methods of
risk management which fall outside of this paradigm, some of which can
be considered as insurance only in a colloquial sense (‘informal’).
(d) ‘Insurance’ and ‘insurance law’
In the light of the above definitions it should by now be clear that the
concepts of ‘insurance’ and ‘insurance law’ used in this paper will go
beyond the formal definitions set out by the South African courts and
legislature. By the term ‘insurance’, this paper merely means to describe
the field of risk management, which is apt for the pluralistic concept of
insurance found in the popular economy and in traditional African
customary-law sources.
III INFORMAL-SECTOR RISK-SPREADING MECHANISMS
(a) Risk-spreading mechanisms falling outside of traditional
definitions of insurance
The mechanisms discussed below are described in the secondary
literature on African customary law and on the popular economy as
having a function of risk management.
(i) Mafisa, sisa or nqoma agreements
This is one of the more traditional forms of risk spreading in South
African communities, reported in some of the written accounts of
African customary law.25 Himonga and Nhlapo deal with mafisa, sisa or
nqoma transactions (hereafter simply ‘sisa transactions’) in their chap-
23 Ibid. Compare the findings of Dickerson, ‘Promises of future performance and
informal-sector transfers of personal property: the example of anglophone Cameroon’ (2011)
Acta Juridica 285 at 300.
24 For an overview, see, generally, Hull & James, (2012) 82 Africa 1.
25 Himonga & Nhlapo, (OUP 2014) 194–195; Bekker, (LexisNexis 2009) para 241.
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ter on customary contracts, as does Bekker in the LAWSA account.26
Essentially, in this type of transaction, a community member who owns
a large herd of cattle or other livestock entrusts a portion of his herd to a
less wealthy member of the community (usually a family member).27
Ownership of the cattle, as well as any progeny, remains with the
benefactor, although the recipient obtains access to milk and other
benefits of possession.28 There is both a social upliftment and a
risk-spreading function present in this type of transaction. From the
cattle owner’s point of view, Bekker describes how a transaction of this
kind hedges against the loss of livestock due to disease, by spreading the
herd over a broader geographical area.29 There is also the advantage of
access to fresh pasture lands.30 African customary law, it should be
noted, knows no concept of prescription.31
Nevertheless, Himonga and Nhlapo add a caution that this may be an
example of a distorted, official version of customary law and that this
practice may be in the process of dying out.32 The concept of a
traditional, pre-commercial notion of contracting in customary law may
also be an incorrect equation between Western concepts of what
constitutes a contract (that is, reciprocal legal rights, created by agree-
ment, and often arising out of property ownership), and African notions
of what constitutes (for example) a sisa transaction, which may be based
instead on a sense of duty, arising out of kinship.33 Bennett discusses the
important role given to promises in African customary law, but notes
that these typically arise in a family situation, rather than between
strangers.34 In a similar vein, he notes that traditional African dispute
resolution is more about mending relationships than enforcing rights
created by legal rules.35 This, he argues, may reflect a society which does
not typically resort to the official state sanctions necessary to enforce
performance (if these were available at all in pre-commercial times).36
Hence the description of customary law as processual, rather than
26 Himonga & Nhlapo, (OUP 2014) 194–195; Bekker, (LexisNexis 2009) para 241.
27 Himonga & Nhlapo, (OUP 2014) 194; Bekker, (LexisNexis 2009) para 241.
28 Himonga & Nhlapo, (OUP 2014) 194; Bekker, (LexisNexis 2009) para 241.
29 Bekker, (LexisNexis 2009) para 241.
30 Himonga & Nhlapo, (OUP 2014) 194–195.
31 Idem 208–209; Bekker, (LexisNexis 2009) para 243.
32 Himonga & Nhlapo, (OUP 2014) 195 (citing Mqeke, Customary Law and the New
Millennium (Lovedale Press 2003) 118).
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rules-based.37 However, Bennett goes on to call for a study of the
heterogeneous population of modern South African townships where
commercial transactions between African parties are common.38 There
is thus a possibility that idealistic notions of a former version of
traditional (perhaps even official) customary contract law may give way
in the future to a new living customary law of contract, as practised in the
popular economy.
(ii) Community/self-insurance
In studies that focus on the economic aspects of the popular economy
rather than customary law, a common source of finance — providing
both credit and a means to deal with calamitous events — is described as
consisting of reciprocal lending among friends, relatives and other
community members.39 Mashigo describes such a network of reciprocal
relationships, which provides a source of finance based on community
relations.40 She describes the lending motive here as ‘inter-dependence’,
supported by a communal sense of obligation and the expectation of
future reciprocity should the parties’ positions reverse.41 The major
collateral provided for such loans is trust, which is facilitated by a high
degree of knowledge of the circumstances and financial habits of the
debtor party.42 In this way, the cost of managing the risk of uncertain
events is spread among the members of a community, who see value in
helping others in need, or feel a cultural sense of duty to do so. This is a
very simple form of risk-pooling mechanism, but is a possible source of
aid to those unable to provide for themselves.
37 Idem 657. Compare Bennett, (Juta 2004) 26–27, citing Comaroff & Roberts, Rules and
Processes (University of Chicago Press 1981). See, also, Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropo-
logical Approach 2 ed (LIT 2000).
38 Bennett, (OUP 2006) 670–671.
39 Mashigo, Extending Credit to the Low-income and Poor Households in South Africa: A
System of Principles (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Johannesburg, 2007) 84–85;
Coetzee, Institutional Change in Rural Financial Markets in South Africa (unpublished PhD
thesis, University of Pretoria, 1997) 50–51. Compare Molefe, Welfare Provision by Selected
Self-Help Organizations — An Exploratory Study (unpublished PhD thesis, University of the
North, 1989) 42–44, who argues (42) that ‘[s]elf-help has been embedded in the traditions of
Blacks from time immemorial’.
40 Mashigo, (2007) 84–85.
41 Idem 84. See, also, Coetzee, (1997) 51.
42 Mashigo, (2007) 85. See the interesting discussion of trust as collateral in Hart, ‘Kinship,
contract, and trust: the economic organization of migrants in an African city slum’ in
Gambetta (ed), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (Blackwell 1988) 176.
In this anthropological study of trust in business relations in the informal economy of Accra,
Ghana, Hart makes the following statement (188): ‘[T]rust is located in the no man’s land
between status and contract, the poles of primitive and modern society in evolutionary
theory.’
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(iii) Stokvels
The literature on stokvels (the South African term for a rotating savings
and credit association) is extensive, both in this country and in the
broader world discourse.43 Stokvels come in many different forms and
varieties. Essentially a form of savings club, members contribute to a
common pool on a regular basis and obtain the right to draw from the
communal pool according to a pre-determined roster.44 Studies of this
phenomenon describe several different functions of this type of device,
from enforced saving for big ticket items (and thereby avoiding interest
on instalment sale credit agreements);45 to saving for funeral expenses
(see part III(a)(iv) below);46 to investment purposes for high contribu-
tion stokvels;47 or as a source of capital to loan funds to third parties at
high interest rates.48 There are also more mundane social functions of
these organisations, such as entertainment and friendship.49 For present
purposes, several authors describe an insurance function of such clubs,
particularly where members are allowed to draw from the communal
pot in a situation of need.50 Access to savings provides a residual source
of surplus funding, which can be used to fund unexpected adverse
events.
43 For useful South African studies of this concept, see Verhoef, ‘Informal financial service
institutions for survival: African women and stokvels in urban South Africa, 1930–1998’
(2001) 2 Enterprise & Society 259; James, Money from Nothing: Indebtedness and Aspiration in
South Africa (Stanford University Press 2014) 118–146; Schulze, ‘The origin and legal nature
of the stokvel’ parts 1 & 2 (1997) 9 SAMLJ 18 and 153; Mashigo & Schoeman, ‘Stokvels as an
instrument and channel to extend credit to poor households in South Africa’ (2012) 5 Journal
of Economic and Financial Services 49. For an international overview, which includes South
Africa, see Ardener, ‘The comparative study of rotating credit associations’ (1964) 94 The
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 201.
44 See, for example, Verhoef, (2001) 2 Enterprise & Society 259 at 263; Schulze, (1997) 9
SAMLJ 18 at 21.
45 James, (Stanford University Press 2015) 123.
46 Verhoef, (2001) 2 Enterprise & Society 259 at 266–269; Schulze, (1997) 9 SAMLJ 18 at
27–29; Thomson & Posel, ‘The management of risk by burial societies in South Africa’ (2002)
2 SA Actuarial J 83.
47 Schulze, (1997) 9 SAMLJ 18 at 25–26; James (Stanford University Press 2015) 142–143;
Kibuuka, Informal Finance for the Middle and High Income Individuals in South Africa: A Case
Study of High Budget ‘Stokvels’ in Pretoria (unpublished MSc thesis, University of Pretoria,
2006).
48 So-called ‘accumulated savings and credit associations’. See James, (Stanford University
Press 2015) 143. Compare the facts of Mndi v Malgas 2006 (2) SA 182 (E).
49 See, for example, Verhoef, (2001) 2 Enterprise & Society 259 at 273–274; Schulze, (1997) 9
SAMLJ 18 at 23–24.
50 Schulze, (1997) 9 SAMLJ 18 at 18–19; Verhoef, (2001) 2 Enterprise & Society 259 at 277.
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(iv) Burial societies
This concept is related to the stokvel idea, in that it is a club through
which contributions are made on a regular basis to a communal pool of
resources.51 Again, there are several different varieties of burial societies,
depending on the rules (or even the written constitution) of such a
group.52 In some societies members would contribute goods or labour
towards a funeral in return for which they had the cover and support of
the society.53 The deceased in this case might be a family member or
relative of a member, or even the member herself.54 In other types of
burial societies, a member might obtain a payment of money intended to
help finance such a funeral.55 Thomson and Posel discuss the practices
surrounding such societies, many of which would observe fairly sophis-
ticated financial practices, such as keeping detailed financial records and
investing communal resources in a formal bank account.56 Some
societies also ongoing have relationships with undertakers or funeral
service providers.57
There are cultural features of such societies remarked upon in the
literature, such as that members might wear a uniform, or have detailed
rules about attendance and meeting procedures.58 Although formed for
a sombre purpose, there are also traces of the social or entertainment
value of these societies in the literature.59 From an insurance point of
view, these organisations provide informal cover for a very common
type of adverse event, circumventing some of the need for private
funeral insurance.
(v) Funeral parlours
A recent empirical study of funeral parlours in South Africa found that
many such businesses are providing a form of funeral insurance within
indigenous communities.60 With current high mortality rates, funeral
parlours appear to be a profitable source of business in the popular
51 For a detailed analysis, see Thomson & Posel, (2002) 2 SA Actuarial J 83. See, also, the
empirical study of Molefe, (1989).








60 Smith & De Vos, ‘The business of death: informal insurance by funeral undertakers in
South Africa’, (2012) available at https://www.utwente.nl/igs/research/conferences/2012/
microinsurance/Full%20papers%20and%20presentations/Full%20papers%204d/Smith%20
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economy. The study suggests that a funeral parlour would often offer a
funeral policy to its customers as part of its commercial operations.61
Some of these policies are underwritten by private insurers, providing a
link to the formal economy, but others are not.62 Indeed, in some cases,
the funeral parlour acts as an insurance intermediary, while in others the
parlour itself is the insurer.63 Where funeral parlours act as insurance
intermediaries, they present a reliable interface with African communi-
ties for private insurers. However, the involvement of such formal-
sector companies immediately brings a certain amount of
administrative red tape and compliance issues, since the formal-sector
regulatory regime then applies.64 The study found that a significant
proportion of funeral parlours actually avoided these issues by simply
providing their own insurance policies without an underwriter, while of
those that were underwritten, only a very small percentage were verified
as financial service providers.65 This, of course, raises prudential and
consumer protection flags — as the study concluded66 — but provides a
source of financing at roots level for communities remote from, or
distrustful of, the formal sector.
(b) Evaluation of informal insurance mechanisms
The literature is mixed in its evaluation of the above informal forms of
insurance. Empirical studies point towards accessibility being a key
advantage of this sector: community members are able to deal with
creditors and finance providers who are known to them and who are
available to deal with them in the geographical location of their
community.67 There is less red tape in accessing payment should an
event occur and less problems with avoidance by insurance providers on
and%20M%20de%20Vos%20paper%20_Bussiness%20of%20death_Research%20Conference




64 Idem 8–10. Compare the story of ‘Shumikazi’ related in Bähre, ‘The Janus face of
insurance in South Africa: from costs to risk, from networks to bureaucracies’ (2012) 82 Africa
150 at 158–159, discussed in footnote 92 and the associated text below.
65 Smith & De Vos, ‘The business of death’ 8–10.
66 Idem 15.
67 Mashigo, (2007) 72–76, discussing credit, rather than insurance, describes, from the
point of view of the popular-economy sector, the problems relating to the formal financial
sector. She explains how the informal sector addresses these at 103–106. Smith & De Vos, ‘The
business of death’ 13–14 point to the additional advantage of employment opportunities
created by informal funeral parlours. Schulze, (1997) 9 SAMLJ 18 at 18–20 speaks of the
exclusion of the popular-economy sector from formal financial products and services in
the pre-democratic era.
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technical grounds.68 A key feature of this sector is trust and community
relations, whereby problems facing private insurers, such as adverse
selection and moral hazard, are reduced, since the character and habits
of insured parties are known to the service providers.69 These institu-
tions and mechanisms provide a method for looking after members of
one’s kin or community to the extent that there is a sense of duty toward
the well-being of community members, such as with reciprocal loans
from friends and relatives, or in some savings clubs and burial societies.
These are positive and laudable developments and reflect cultural
responses to the problem of risk management.
However, problems with informal insurance mechanisms are also
reported. These issues are intrinsically related to the nature of the
medium in question. Typical concerns might be fraudulent manage-
ment of the communal savings by members of savings clubs or burial
societies.70 Similarly, the lack of penetration of formal law and the
expense of formal legal procedures make it difficult to enforce payment
by recalcitrant debtors in a situation where mere trust is the collateral.71
Peer pressure and impairment of one’s community reputation are
reported as the key sanctions for non-payment of debts due, but this
only works in a close-knit community, which may not always be the case
in some of South Africa’s larger townships.72 On the more formal end of
the informal spectrum, funeral parlours present a useful interface
between private insurers and the community, but in the absence of
effective government monitoring, many funeral parlours avoid pruden-
tial and compliance regulations, thereby presenting a risk to consu-
mers.73 Similarly, the risk of fraudulent behaviour or insolvency of such
operators presents further problems for their customer base.74
The positive thus has to be balanced with the negative in evaluating
this sector. Anecdotal evidence from certain empirical studies reflects
that the indigenous community sees value in these forms of insurance,75
68 See the discussion in Bähre, (2012) 82 Africa 150.
69 Trust, reciprocity and inter-dependence feature large in Mashigo’s account of the
informal credit sector (see (2007) chap 4). See, also (for a comparative perspective from
Cameroon), the empirical study on informal-sector traders by Dickerson, (2011) Acta
Juridica 285 at 297–298, who describes the role of trust and knowledge of trading partners in
informal commerce and the link here to enforcement of contracts in this sector.
70 See, for example, Thomson & Posel, (2002) 2 SA Actuarial J 83 at 88–94.
71 Ibid.
72 Idem 109–111.
73 Compare the conclusions of Smith & De Vos, ‘The business of death’ 14–16.
74 Ibid.
75 Compare the findings of Thomson & Posel, (2002) 2 SA Actuarial J 83 at 123; see, also,
James, (Stanford University Press 2015) 122–125 on the prevalence and utility of burial
societies and savings clubs respectively.
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which are possibly better suited to meet the needs of the population they
serve. For instance, the technicalities of the law of insurance around
issues such as disclosure and misrepresentation, timely payment of
premiums, avoidance of claims and dispute resolution procedures are
avoided through the accessibility and informality of most of the above
responses. The concomitant risk, however, arises around issues like
potential simultaneous claims and the lack of re-insurance; as well as a
lack of proper actuarial assessment of risk.76 These are some of the key
advantages offered by private insurers.
In this regard, it would appear that private insurers have indeed
turned their attention to the popular-economy market, a trend which is
of course profit driven, rather than altruistically motivated.77 The
government seems to support this initiative, as we shall see with
the developing law surrounding the so-called micro-insurance phenom-
enon.78 This private-sector intervention will be described and evaluated
in the following section.
IV FORMAL INSURANCE MECHANISMS
(a) Selected examples of formal insurance mechanisms
The examples below are intended as a non-exhaustive list of the most
prevalent forms of formal insurance in the popular economy.
(i) Funeral insurance from private insurance companies
By far the most prevalent private insurance product in the popular-
economy sector is funeral insurance.79 Indigenous African communities
place a high premium on a decent burial, which is usually accompanied
by a large wake.80 Sometimes there are also costs due to having to
repatriate a corpse to an ancestral land.81 The expenses involved in
paying service providers and hosting a large gathering of family and
community members can have a crippling effect on a low-income
76 These risks are highlighted in Smith & De Vos, ‘The business of death’ and Thomson &
Posel, (2002) 2 SA Actuarial J 83 at 104–116.
77 Compare the argument of Bähre, (2012) 82 Africa 150.
78 See below in part IV(a)(iv).
79 Compare the findings of Bähre, (2012) 82 Africa 150 at 151. Compare, also, the
discussion in Nienaber & Preiss, ‘Funeral insurance: a perception from the office of the
ombudsman for long-term insurance’ (2006) 18 SAMLJ 291 at 291–292.
80 Compare Schulze, (1997) 9 SAMLJ 18 at 27; Verhoef, (2001) 2 Enterprise & Society 259 at
267.
81 Verhoef, (2001) 2 Enterprise & Society 259 at 267; Thomson & Posel (2002) 2 SA
Actuarial J 83 at 108.
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family.82 As a result, funeral insurance is the key insurance product in
demand in the popular economy.
Studies reveal that the financial sector has targeted the popular
economy for the sale of different types of financial products — not just
insurance, but also credit facilities and investment products.83 This
move is profit driven, since there is a desire to access the ‘money under
the mattress’.84 Nevertheless, the results of increase in cover provided to
this market by private insurers appear to be mixed. In an empirical study
of insurance in the popular economy published in 2012, Bähre reported
anecdotal evidence of insured parties who had struggled to interface
with private insurers when making claims following an adverse event, or
when disputing an insurer’s avoidance of all or part of their claim.85
From the insurer’s perspective access to communities is a problem that
requires culturally appropriate solutions. Bähre describes how insurance
companies use community members as brokers, unfortunately often
with financial and personal repercussions for those intermediaries
themselves.86 Thus insurance products are peddled by church goers to
members of their congregation, or to other networks of friends and
acquaintances in the community.87 Due to the fact that these are only
intermediaries, however, problems of access and dispute resolution arise
when the insurer’s head office refuses to pay out on a claim when an
event occurs.88
An alternative method used by insurers is to use community groups as
intermediaries.89 As Bähre notes, it is not uncommon to provide
insurance cover on a group basis, but when insured parties are not
formally employed, less conventional groups are utilised.90 This results
in intermediation by burial societies, clubs, funeral parlours (as per part
III(a)(v) above), and church congregations (particularly the Zion
82 Schulze, (1997) 9 SAMLJ 18 at 27; Verhoef, (2001) 2 Enterprise & Society 259 at 267.
83 See, for example, Bähre, (2012) 82 Africa 150 at 150–152; Hull & James, (2012) 82 Africa
1 at 4.
84 This phrase is borrowed from Mpedi & Millard, (2010) 31 Obiter 497 at 509.
85 Bähre, (2012) 82 Africa 150 at 160–163.
86 Idem 152–156. Bähre discusses the case of ‘Bantu’, who was locked into a long-term
brokering contract by an insurer, but found that his commission was far lower than his
expectations, meaning that he had difficulties in meeting his own business outlays. There were
also costs involved through his community membership, where other members expected him
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Christian Church (ZCC)).91 This creates fewer personal complications
than using individual brokers (for those community members who
would otherwise act in this capacity) and has worked particularly well
with the ZCC. However, issues such as the necessity to comply with
regulations surrounding financial intermediation and inequality of
bargaining power still remain.92
Nevertheless, some consumer complaints do manage to find a voice
within the formal sector. Indeed, the website for the ombud for the
long-term insurance industry contains details of many complaints with
which it has dealt and a high proportion of these deal with funeral
insurance.93 Nienaber and Preiss report that during their tenures as
ombud and deputy ombud respectively, about fifteen per cent of all
complaints that they had received were based on funeral insurance.94 In
an article from 2006, they reflect on the problems in resolving this kind
of complaint with insurers, who are often technically within their rights
to avoid claims.95 This evidence points toward expectations of the
popular-economy market not being in line with common insurance
practices, and an asymmetry of information about the products which
are being sold to community members. Consumer protection is thus
clearly a key problem in this sector.96 While compliance with prudential
regulations and actuarial risk-assessment methods ensure that private
insurers remain in a position to pay out on claims and that correct
premiums are charged for cover provided, the intricacies of formal
insurance law and inaccessibility of distant companies make these
products problematic for the popular-economy market.
A final point on funeral insurance is its widespread availability. Given
the demand for this product, it is marketed extensively using cell-phone
messaging and other forms of advertising. Indeed, a funeral-insurance
91 Ibid.
92 Idem 157–159. The problems with this interface are illustrated by a narrative related to
Bähre by one ‘Shumikazi’, the proprietor of a funeral parlour selling funeral cover. When the
underwriting insurer implemented unilateral changes to contractual terms, this caused
knock-on problems for Shumikazi in dealing with her clientele, who were all members of her
own community.
93 The website of the ombud for long-term insurance can be found at http://
www.ombud.co.za, accessed on 27 June 2016. For the prevalence of funeral insurance
complaints, see Nienaber & Preiss, (2006) 18 SAMLJ 291 at 292.
94 Nienaber & Preiss, (2006) 18 SAMLJ 291 at 292.
95 Ibid: this article describes common complaints lodged against long-term insurers
providing funeral cover and, in some cases, how the office of the ombud resolved these.
96 This is despite the existing consumer-protection mechanisms, especially those under the
Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002 and its accompanying
regulations, and the policy-holder protection measures under the Long-term Insurance Act
52 of 1998.
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premium is the one lawful deduction which can be made from a
government social grant.97 Such deduction may amount to up to 10 per
cent of the total grant amount, extending the availability of such cover to
a broader spectrum of consumers. However, in many instances this
entails deducting premiums from a grant which may have to support
many extended family members in a climate where such recipients are
invariably struggling to make ends meet.98
(ii) Other forms of private insurance
Bähre’s statistics indicate that other insurance products are also pur-
chased in the popular-economy sector, such as credit insurance.99 He
also found other forms of risk-management financial products such as
medical-aid cover and pensions.100 Nonetheless, these other forms of
insurance (very broadly conceived) were far less prevalent than funeral
cover.101 Churchill, writing from a global perspective, points toward
expectations from those not accustomed to insurance products that one
should not have to pay premiums and get nothing in return should no
adverse event occur.102 By contrast, more traditional forms of risk-
management practices, such as stokvels, are in some ways more a form of
compulsory savings mechanisms than true insurance devices.103
(iii) Compulsory state insurance
Other forms of insurance prevalent in the popular economy are those
forms of state insurance, such as those compulsory for workers who are
(or have previously been) in formal employment (as mentioned
above).104 Thus the Unemployment Insurance Fund and various work-
ers’ compensation schemes, which are insurance funds set up by statute,
97 Section 20(4) of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 read with reg 26A.
98 At the time of writing (June 2016), a so-called grant for older persons amounted to
R1 500 per month. A disability grant was also R1 500 per month. Under reg 26A(2), no
deduction can be made from any of the various categories of child-care grants.
99 Bähre, (2012) 82 Africa 150 at 151–152. In his empirical study of 110 residents of two
Cape Town townships, Bähre found that 63 per cent of respondents had at least one funeral
policy; 44 per cent had UIF; 27 per cent had a medical aid; 26 per cent had a pension fund and
24 per cent had a mortgage which included credit insurance.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Churchill, ‘What is insurance for the poor?’ in Churchill (ed), Protecting the Poor: A
Microinsurance Compendium (International Labour Office (ILO) 2006) 20.
103 Churchill, (ILO 2006) 13–14 notes that he is using the term ‘insurance’ in a narrow
sense to exclude ‘general risk-prevention and -management techniques’, which would differ
from parts of the excursus in part III above. The present author feels that a broader picture
gives a better perspective of indigenous risk management in South Africa.
104 See footnote 99 and (generally) Olivier, (LexisNexis 2012) paras 175–180.
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provide cover to those who have lost their jobs or been injured at
work.105 For those who drive vehicles, the Road Accident Fund Act
provides a form of insurance against losses resulting from motor vehicle
accidents.106
(iv) Micro-insurance
This is a government-backed initiative to spread private insurance cover
to the low income market.107 A 2011 National Treasury policy document
envisioned the promulgation of a Micro-insurance Act, or amendment
to the existing Long- and Short-term Insurance Acts to establish a
micro-insurance framework.108 The current Insurance Bill is one of the
results of this policy and is intended to (inter alia) establish a regulatory
framework for micro-insurers to enter the market, such as through a
change to the governing licensing rules.109 The Treasury’s intention is to
create affordable insurance products appropriate for the target market,
while still ensuring consumer protection for those who purchase such
products.110 The policy document speaks of less technical legal require-
ments regarding disclosure and misrepresentation; a simplification of
claims procedures; and generally less compliance-related red tape for
this sector.111 Non-payment of insurance premiums is a problem that
requires particular attention and the policy document aims to address
the issue of intermittent flow of income, which — when combined with
other existing demands on scarce household resources — can lead to
irregular payment of premiums.112 The intention is to provide a means
for policies, particularly of the long-term insurance variety, to resume
105 Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act 4 of 2002; Compensation for Occupa-
tional Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993; Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act
78 of 1973.
106 Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996.
107 See Mpedi & Millard, (2010) 31 Obiter 497; and the South African National Treasury
Policy Document, ‘The South African microinsurance regulatory framework’ (July 2011),
available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/publications/other/MicroinsuranceRegulatory
Framework/Policy%20Document%20Micro%20Insurance.pdf, accessed on 24 May 2017.
108 National Treasury Policy Document (July 2011) 60–61.
109 Bill B1–2016, available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west–1.amazonaws.com/
160128b_1_-_2016_insurance.pdf, accessed on 24 May 2017. See the long title for the
intention to create a micro-insurance framework which promotes financial inclusion.
Licensing is dealt with in chap 4 of the Bill.
110 Idem 1.
111 Idem part 2, particularly 43 and 46. See, further, Mpedi & Millard, (2010) 31 Obiter 497;
Millard, ‘Harnessing the informal economy: some reflections on National Treasury’s policy
document on the South African microinsurance regulatory framework’ (2012) 75 THRHR
665.
112 National Treasury Policy Document (July 2011) 14–15.
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following a payment hiatus.113 Cover will also be capped at certain (fairly
low) amounts to demarcate the borders of micro-insurance.114
Studies have indicated that such products are already available in
South Africa and other parts of the developing world.115 Micro-
insurance products are being sold in innovative ways, such as by using
retail outlets as intermediaries.116 Private insurers are also attempting to
tailor their products to the sector in question.117 Consumer protection,
which is under development in the entire insurance sector in South
Africa, will hopefully receive special attention when the new micro-
insurance statute is promulgated.118
(b) Evaluation
More than one commentator has described the nature of private
insurers operating in the low income market as ‘Janus-faced’.119 This
two-faced ambiguity captures the different perspectives presented by
this phenomenon. Thus, while private insurance offers greater protec-
tion for insured parties through adherence to highly regulated pruden-
tial and other related requirements, there is also evidence of a lack of fit
between formal sector, profit-driven companies and a consumer market
whose participants may possibly lack some of the characteristics needed
to best take advantage of what private insurance has to offer. Arguably
private insurance operates most beneficially among consumers who are
characterised by a high level of financial literacy, adequate disposable
113 Currently s 52 of the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 allows a grace period of 15
days before cover may lapse. See the National Treasury Policy Document (July 2011) 14–15,
although this document does not discuss funeral cover specifically. See, also, Nienaber &
Preiss, (2006) 18 SAMLJ 291 at 313–314, describing how although most insurers will allow a
grace period of 30 days for non-payment of premiums, non-payment for longer periods will
result in a loss of cover, leaving the office of the ombud with little scope to help insured parties.
114 National Treasury Policy Document (July 2011) 8–9.
115 For a comprehensive South African analysis, see Roux, Including the Excluded: The
Potential of Microinsurance to Provide Low-Income Earners with Access to Financial Products
(unpublished LLM dissertation, University of Johannesburg, 2015).
116 Idem chap 3.
117 Ibid.
118 This is certainly one of the clear goals of part 2 of the National Treasury Policy
Document. See, further, the discussion in Roux, (2015) chaps 2 and 3. The new Financial
Sector Regulation Bill (B34–2015) will move South Africa towards a so-called twin peaks
model of financial regulation, which will see the establishment of a market conduct authority
and market conduct regulations. A text of the Bill is available at http://pmg-assets.s3-website-
eu-west–1.amazonaws.com/b_34_-_2015_financial_sector_regulation.pdf, accessed on
24 May 2017. See chap 4 for the establishment of a market conduct authority and item 106 for
the empowering provision under which market standards will be regulated.
119 Churchill, (ILO 2006) 15–16; Bähre, (2012) 82 Africa 150 at 152. Janus was the Roman
god of gates and doors, usually depicted with two faces and one body.
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income and knowledge of their consumer rights. Conversely, the
popular-economy market is characterised by irregular income, lack of
experience of private insurers and their products as well as a lack of
knowledge of technical insurance law. The remoteness and inaccessibil-
ity of an insurer’s head office often presents further problems when
submitting claims or challenging a repudiation. Anecdotal evidence
presented through Bähre’s empirical study, or as reflected in Nienaber
and Preiss’s 2006 paper and in complaints on the website of the ombud
for long-term insurance, suggests that the extension of private insurance
to the popular-economy sector has not been without problems.
The new micro-insurance regime is intended to address these pro-
blems in South Africa, particularly with regard to consumer protection;
there is certainly scope herein for South Africa to improve on the
negative issues highlighted above in part IV(a). If the new micro-
insurance regime can improve this situation, then potentially the
short-comings of the informal sector (identified above in part III(b)) can
be overcome through a new kind of private insurance specifically
adapted to the popular-economy market. It may well be, however, that
the lack of fit between the popular-economy sector and private financial
institutions, identified by Mashigo in her study of micro-credit, contin-
ues.120 In an insurance context this may be precisely because private
insurers are profit driven, rather than grass-roots community organisa-
tions. Regardless of the success of micro-insurance in South Africa,
burial societies, stokvels and other forms of community savings and
risk-management clubs are likely to remain, simply because they fill a
demand. Thus the cultural aspect of the popular-economy insurance
market remains a highly important one.
In the next part, this article turns to a comparative case study of the
marketing of formal-sector funeral insurance products to indigenous
peoples in Australia. This is intended to illustrate that the cultural (or
customary) elements of the Australian indigenous insurance market
show a marked degree of similarity to that in South Africa, while
formal-sector insurance law similarly lags behind the needs of the target
market in Australia.
V COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY: FUNERAL INSURANCE
IN AUSTRALIA
Australia is better described as a developed rather than a developing
economy, and displays characteristics of being a state with an advanced
120 Mashigo, (2007) 75–76.
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welfare system as well as a lack of the abject poverty which characterises
much of South Africa.121 Nevertheless, there are certain overlaps
between the respective positions of the Australian and South African
indigenous populations, with regard to both under-development — due
to past discriminatory practices at the hands of a white ruling elite — as
well as a strong legacy of customs and customary law.122
It is an interesting cultural parallel between these two indigenous
populations to observe that a culturally appropriate funeral is also a
priority for most Australian indigenous peoples, and that this is similarly
a potentially calamitous expense, which needs to be carefully provided
for.123 Vines describes the following features of a culturally appropriate
indigenous funeral (with reference to the training manual of a leading
Australian provider of indigenous funeral cover):124
• a burial, as opposed to a cremation;
• coffin painting, as a cultural rite of passage into the afterlife, to be
done by a professional artist;
• transport of the body back to the ancestral homelands if the
deceased died in a different location;
• the funeral service itself, to be attended by the full extended
family, sometimes amounting to a few hundred people;
• a smoking ceremony, performed in the house of the deceased by
an elder of the community for a fee;
• a wailing ceremony for the extended family after the funeral
service, which may last three to five days;
121 For a description of Australia as a rich country with income statistics, see Piketty,
Capital in the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press 2014) 174, 177–178. For an
historical account of Australia as a welfare state, see Castles, ‘Needs-based strategies of social
protection in Australia and New Zealand’ in Esping-Andersen (ed), Welfare States in
Transition: National Adaptations in Global Economies (Sage Publications 1996) 88.
122 On indigenous Australian law, see Vines, Law and Justice in Australia: Foundations of the
Legal System 3 ed (OUP 2013). Chapters 6 and 10 of this work deal in particular with past
discriminatory practices against the indigenous population in Australia. For a comparative
discussion of indigenous law comparing the Australian position with the South African one,
see Harris, ‘Indigenous law in South Africa — lessons for Australia?’ (1998) 5 James Cook
University LR 70.
123 Vines, ‘The New South Wales project on the inheritance needs of Aboriginal people:
solving the problems by making culturally appropriate wills’ (2012) 16 Australian Indigenous
LR 18 at 23–24; Vines, Aboriginal Wills Handbook: A Practical Guide to Making Culturally
Appropriate Wills for Aboriginal People 2 ed (NSW Trustee & Guardian 2015); Australian
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), ‘Paying for funerals’, available at https://
www.moneysmart.gov.au/media/131954/paying-for-funerals.pdf, accessed on 28 June 2016.
124 Vines, (2012) 16 Australian Indigenous LR 18 at 24. This same manual was cited by the
court in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Aboriginal Community Benefit
Fund Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 178 para 17.
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• a returning home service, should the funeral be conducted in a
remote location before return of the body to the ancestral lands;
and
• a second wake one year after the death for extended family
members who choose to reattend.
The net result of this is that a culturally appropriate funeral can cost
between A$4 000 and A$15 000.125 This is a considerable expense and
far exceeds the typical cost of a non-indigenous funeral.126 The result is
that private insurers have targeted the indigenous market for the sale of
funeral insurance.127 Indeed, one of the major providers of such
insurance, the Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund (the Fund) has been
involved in a series of disputes with the Australian Securities and
Investments Commission (ASIC),128 particularly with regard to exploi-
tative marketing practices.129 In 2004, the latest in this series of disputes
reached the Federal Court of Australia, where ASIC challenged the
Fund’s door-to-door marketing practices, which were found to be in
breach of certain of the financial services provisions under the Corpora-
tions Acts 2001 (Cth).130 In a return hearing, however, the Federal Court
declined to impose a severe sanction on the Benefit Fund, due (inter alia)
to the risk of impact on its financial standing, which could have had a
knock-on effect on existing policy-holders.131
Today ASIC provides a useful and consumer-friendly guide to planning
for funeral expenses on its MoneySmart consumer website.132 This
document, titled ‘Paying for funerals’, seeks to warn indigenous and
low-income readers against the pitfalls of funeral-insurance products. The
125 ASIC, ‘Paying for funerals’ 2.
126 The list of culturally appropriate requirements above should demonstrate why this is so.
127 Vines, (2012) 16 Australian Indigenous LR 18 at 23–24; Vines, (NSW Trustee &
Guardian 2015) 20–21.
128 ASIC is the market conduct regulator in the Australian financial regulatory system. See,
generally, Pearson, ‘Making prudence: consumer credit and twin peaks, a comparison of
Australia and South Africa’ (2016) 27 Journal of Banking and Finance Law and Practice 223.
129 See ASIC v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund (footnote 124). The litigation history of
the Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund is set out in paras 7–12 of this judgment. Essentially,
the Fund was set up in 1992. Within one year, the NSW Department of Consumer Affairs
obtained an injunction against the Fund’s marketing practices in the Supreme Court of NSW.
After a corporate reshuffle, the injunction was vacated in 1994. In 1999, however, ASIC
commenced fresh proceedings against the Fund, which resulted in a consent order requiring
the Fund to change its marketing practices. In the 2004 hearing, the Fund’s marketing
practices were found, once again, to breach the Corporations Act of 2001 and its associated
regulations.
130 Ibid.
131 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Aboriginal Community Benefit Fund
Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 963 paras 13–18.
132 ASIC, ‘Paying for funerals’.
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document provides lists of questions to ask of salesmen and financial
service providers selling funeral cover.133 It also advises consumers to
think carefully before subscribing to insurance products and to conduct
private research by talking to family members or a financial counsellor.134
This document seems to also recommend ordinary savings accounts, or
funeral-specific savings policies, as a method of locking away money from
other day-to-day consumption expenditure in order to provide money to
pay for a funeral.135 The reason for this advice is that if a consumer is no
longer able to continue contributing to the fund each month, he or she at
least retains moneys paid thus far.136 Similarly, if a large balance accrues
over a long period of time, the benefit is not capped at the cost of a funeral,
since family members can access the surplus after paying funeral costs.137
This is indeed a sensible option, particularly in an environment which
enjoys a higher degree of penetration of formal-sector financial services
among the indigenous population.138
Interestingly, the literature does not discuss informal sector insurance
as found in South Africa, probably due to a lack of a popular economy in
the sense used thus far in this paper.139 There also does not appear to be a
formal regime of micro-insurance in place, although a study by Good
Shepherd Microfinance reflects that there is a need for this among
low-income Australians.140 The Good Shepherd study suggests a broad
range of micro-insurance products, from household-contents policies,
to vehicle insurance, to funeral cover, to life insurance.141 This lack of an
over-arching legislative framework in any of its composite jurisdictions
further distinguishes the present Australian situation from that envi-
133 Idem 7, 8, 12 and 15.




138 Compare the empirical findings of Vines, (2012) 16 Australian Indigenous LR 18 at 23.
139 Idem 23–24. Vines (NSW Trustee & Guardian 2015) 20–21 speaks only of formal-sector
funeral insurance. It should be noted, however, that there is discussion of a ‘frontier economy’
in Australia, where indigenous and Western commercial norms meet, and which is usually
notionally located in the remote areas of Australia. See for discussion: McDonnell & Martin,
‘Indigenous community stores in the ‘‘frontier economy’’: some competition and consumer
issues’ Discussion Paper 234/2002, Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research, available
at http://caepr.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/Publications/DP/2002_DP234.pdf, accessed on
24 May 2017.
140 Good Shepherd Microfinance, ‘Insurance for low-income Australians: taking innova-
tive action’ Discussion Paper (2013), available at http://www.goodshepherdmicrofinance.
org.au/sites/default/files/0849%20GOOD%20SHEPHERD%20MICROFINANCE%20
REPORT%20FINAL.pdf accessed on 28 June 2016.
141 Good Shepherd Microfinance, ‘Insurance for low-income Australians’ 15–16.
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sioned in the South African National Treasury Policy Document. In any
comparison of national laws, one should consider differences in culture
and context between the jurisdictions under study. The most obvious
inference to be drawn from the above discrepancy is that there is a
political willpower in South Africa to enact a legislative framework to
provide insurance to low-income consumers, particularly from the
indigenous population, given the fact that the ruling African National
Congress operates on a mandate from a largely indigenous and low-
income electorate.142
The other inference to be drawn is that there is scope here for South
Africa to lead the way in promoting culturally appropriate solutions to
insurance (and broader financial sector) regulation. However, cultiva-
tion of a world-leading, formal-insurance sector need not be at the
expense of existing cultural responses in the popular economy. To
address the question posed in the title, this article will now, in
conclusion, turn to the question as to the possibility of a customary law
of insurance in South Africa.
VI CONCLUSION: A CUSTOMARY LAW OF INSURANCE?
South Africa is blessed with excellent financial services providers and has
a dependable system of courts in which the rule of law is enshrined.
While the common law of contract is in a state of flux under the auspices
of a transformative Constitution and a proactive Constitutional
Court,143 the statutes which form a large part of the law of insurance in
South Africa are well established and extensively regulate insurance
companies and financial intermediaries.144 Indeed, when the general
Consumer Protection Act was promulgated, insurance contracts were
expressly omitted, since it was felt by the legislature that this sector
already had adequate consumer protection.145 The extension of this
142 Compare the argument of Bennett, (OUP 2006) 663–666 that the treatment of African
customary law in the present dispensation reflects an ideological disposition towards this
construct, which in turn is a reflection of political power.
143 From an insurance point of view, see, in particular, Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323
(CC), which was the first in a line of Constitutional Court cases dealing with the common law
of contract. There a challenge to a 90 day time-bar clause in a short-term insurance policy was
not upheld, but the court did note for present purposes (paras 28, 51 and 56) that a clause in a
contract, and the enforcement thereof, had to comply with public policy, which was informed
by, inter alia, constitutional rights and values as well as the African customary-law concept of
ubuntu.
144 See, especially, the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998; the Short-term Insurance Act
53 of 1998; and the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002.
145 Act 68 of 2008. See Schedule 2, Item 10. For discussion of this provision, see Naudé &
Eiselen (eds), Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (Juta 2015).
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formal-sector insurance cover and the concomitant law to the popular
economy thus has a lot to offer this new demographic, not least of which
is increased consumer protection.
The micro-insurance phenomenon is already present in the South
African market and the government’s desire to create a specific regula-
tory regime for the low-income demographic is a positive step. Indeed,
South Africa’s first-world, private-insurance sector and dispute-
resolution structures could bring many benefits to the popular-
economy sector. The problem of course is fit: anecdotal evidence
highlighted above suggests that the existing system is not fully serving
the needs of the low-income market for a variety of reasons, from the
geographical, to the economic, to the cultural. If South Africa is able to
resolve these issues through a new Micro-insurance Act (or some similar
intervention), this country has the potential to be a world leader in this
field. Indeed, the Australian experience of private insurers exploiting the
indigenous market’s desire to provide for a culturally appropriate
funeral shows that the problem of lack of fit is not unique to South
Africa, or even to developing economies. If South Africa can marry its
developed sectors with its undeveloped ones, this will help to alleviate
poverty through the reduction of the impact of calamitous events.
The description of the manner in which private insurers have entered
the popular economy market as Janus-faced,146 speaks to the issue of ‘fit’
described above. Although conventional economics most likely moti-
vate commercial activities in the popular economy — and these should
not be viewed as being somehow divorced from business realities — the
scale and resources of private insurance companies give them an
enormously unequal power in dealing with consumers in this market.
Thus profit-driven corporations have the potential to exploit consu-
mers, even when interfacing with this sector through community-based
intermediary persons or groups. There is evidence to support a claim
that a good deal of contracting in the popular economy is based on trust,
with knowledge of the habits and circumstances of one’s counter party
in the transaction serving as collateral. It is submitted that this factor is a
key feature of customary contract behaviour, which should be given
recognition when developing the living customary law of contracts.
Similarly, given that some of the mechanisms which make up this
customary contract law have a risk-spreading function, why should a
customary-law of insurance not be included in this process? This
development would serve two alternative purposes of allowing, on the
146 See the discussion in part IV(b) above.
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one hand, a culturally appropriate synthesis with the formal regime;
while, on the other hand, entrenching a parallel popular economy or
customary regime in its own right, for those transactions and institu-
tions which continue (in accordance with freedom of contract and
freedom of economic activity) to be conducted in a more traditional
format.
For those who prefer the protection of formal-sector private insurance
practices, micro-insurance is a viable alternative. This regime is intended
to regulate (in large part) the same groups of the population who would
consider themselves subject to customary law. Why should micro-
insurance then not involve a synthesis of customary rules and values into
its conventional regulatory structure, as suggested in the preceding
paragraph? A culturally appropriate system of micro-insurance law would
possibly serve the indigenous market better than the established common
law of insurance. The trick will be to affect this in balance with the
commercial requirements of insurers and the need for legal certainty.
To achieve appropriate legal development for either of the current
popular-economy format, or a more formalised micro-insurance ver-
sion, the study of living customary contract law and customary insu-
rance practices by conventional contract and insurance lawyers is an
imperative.
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